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This paper looks in detail at the social and economic background of mobile airtime sellers 
on the streets of Kigali. While informal networks have proved to be an invaluable 
resource for large multinational telecommunication companies seeking to penetrate 
African markets, changing technological capabilities may soon displace them. As 
Rwanda develops its internet and payment systems, companies and institutions hope to 
provide airtime and services directly. The paper draws on interviews with  airtime sellers 
in three neighbourhoods of Kigali to ask what this temporary source of employment has 
done to their long-term career prospects. While Rwandan government ICT strategy has 
hereto focused on high-end ICT and Business Process Outsourcing, this paper uses the 
experiences of airtime sellers to advocate for a more bottom-up approach to 
entrepreneurship and economic development in Rwanda. Following calls by Elyachar 
(2012), Dolan (2012) and Meagher (2013), we stress that planners and researchers need 
to think more critically about value chains at the bottom of the pyramid, not just in terms 
of how informal networks can be used as temporary appendages to further the reach of 
formal multinational corporations, but how these new kinds of chains and networks can 
be re-engineered to provide permanent and sustainable livelihoods to workers and 
business owners at the base of the economy. 
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Introduction 
In 2001, Frederick Cooper wrote: “Africa is filled with areas where international 
investors do not go, even when there are minerals that would repay investor’s efforts. To 
get to such places requires not deregulation, but institutions and networks capable of 
getting there” (Cooper, 2001, 207). This paper examines the institutions and networks 
that have allowed multinational telecommunication companies to access Rwanda’s 
markets. In contrast with the older patterns of capital investment such as mining, 
agriculture or manufacturing, telecommunication requires both heavy infrastructural 
investment and the uptake of that infrastructure by the population. Thus unlike former 
patterns of enclave growth, telecommunication development requires making people 
customers, and making territories ‘legible’ markets (Scott, 1998; Ferguson, 2005).  
In Rwanda, telecommunications development has incorporated both institution-building 
and informal labour. Through its various arms, the Government of Rwanda (henceforth, 
GoR) has intervened to attract multinational companies into the country to build a 
foundation for an ICT enabled knowledge-based economy. It has done so through 
building and managing physical infrastructure, financing the entrance of multinational 
companies, buying bulk bandwidth capacity from international providers and re-
engineering the physical and political environment to make it more attractive to foreign 
investment. At the same time, the GoR has allowed multinational companies to use 
informal labour to penetrate the market, creating fleeting opportunities for work and 
capital accumulation at the bottom of the pyramid. The sanctioned use of informal labour 
by such corporations stands in sharp contrast with the treatment of independent street 
hawkers and other informal groups who are forbidden from engaging in commercial 
activities. While the GoR emphasizes entrepreneurship as a plank in its development 
programs and discourse, strategy currently stipulates that entrepreneurship must fit within 
the strategies and interests of government and large-scale business.  
With the growing awareness of the developmental potential of ‘big data’, coupled with 
the desire by telecommunication companies to shift towards enhanced customer service, 
African telecommunications sectors are gravitating towards a more disintermediated form 
of airtime distribution. This shift towards ‘big data’ is desirable for companies wishing to 
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extend services but it is also strategic for young ICT entrepreneurs seeking to monetize 
applications and for governments wishing to target citizens for security, surveillance and 
taxation purposes. Thus while unregulated sellers helped telecommunication companies 
to achieve their rapid rates of penetration at the dawn of mobile telecommunications, they 
may not be so suitable for the next stage in its development. Some companies have 
already begun the transition away from network expansion towards enhanced customer 
service and data services. In Rwanda, this transition was described in interviews with a 
range of companies including the large telecoms, MTN, Tigo, and Airtel and by 
managers of local start-ups such as SMS Media, Cyuda, Pivot Access and Vantage 
Technologies.  
While the sellers themselves may not know it, a change is coming and they may soon 
need to find other types of employment. This paper focuses on that trajectory, sharing the 
results of a street survey conducted with 27 airtime sellers on the streets of Kigali in the 
summer of 2012. We first document the gains accrued by the individuals involved and 
then go on to query whether these gains will have lasting effects on social mobility.   
Section one situates the position of airtime sellers within a broader understanding of the 
GoR’s economic strategy in relation to ICTs. As the GoR seeks to attract international 
investment and transform the country into an ICT hub, it must increase the penetration of 
the telecommunications network, both through infrastructure and through the 
consumption of ICTs by ordinary Rwandans. In this regard, informally contracted airtime 
sellers have played a pivotal role, alongside massive government efforts to build 
infrastructure and create favourable formal institutions for investment and growth.  
Section two moves on to describe the social and economic background of the street 
sellers interviewed by the authors. It reveals their relatively high earnings, their higher 
use of ICTs and their more active participation in saving schemes as compared to the 
wider Rwandan population. In short, informalized airtime distribution has provided real 
short-term benefits to those involved.  
Section three describes respondents’ plans for the future. In contrast to other studies of 
poor youth in Rwanda (Sommers, 2012), airtime sellers are overwhelmingly positive 
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about their futures. At the same time, most seemed unaware of shifting company and 
government strategies away from informal distribution networks towards digital 
distribution. In this final section, we describe the tensions between the GoR’s top-down 
economic development plans and the economic realities faced by ordinary Rwandans.  
The GoR’s style of development has been characterised by others (Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi, 2012; Kelsall, 2013) as a ‘developmental patrimonial state’ model, with a highly 
disciplined technocracy implementing a state-led economic transformation in 
collaboration with party-statals and foreign capital. However useful this analysis is for 
understanding political commitment to development, it ignores how such large-scale 
investment (both multinational or domestic) affects ordinary Rwandans and informal 
economic livelihoods on the ground. As scholars like Purdekova (2011; 2012) have 
shown this model has often involved heavy-handed social engineering at the level of 
everyday Rwandan society. In order to transform the economic landscape, the GoR has 
stepped up control over informal economic activities (Rollason, 2013) and has attempted 
to re-orient the political imaginations of ordinary Rwandans away from the dangerous 
rhetoric of political tribalism that underscored the genocide to new ideas about 
entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency (Mann and Berry, unpublished). However as we 
will show, Rwandans are supposed to become entrepreneurs but not in ways that might 
imperil the wider strategy of attracting foreign investment.  
Rwandan government strategy for enabling Information and Communication Technology 
(ICTs)-led growth has hereto focused on high-end software and application development 
and on Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). It seems unclear how low-income and 
formally less-educated people like the men and women surveyed in this paper are to be 
included. In this sense, the paper urges Rwandan policy-makers to more actively engage 
with ordinary citizens in their developmental plans.  
This work is based on collaborative research conducted by researchers from the Rwandan 
ICT Chambers and the Oxford Internet Institute over the summer of 2012. The research 
took place within two wider projects and reflects the two disciplinary backgrounds of the 
authors. The ICT Chambers is in the process of developing a methodology for measuring 
 
 
 5 
the impact of ICTs on the economy of Rwanda. Author 2 is an economist by training and 
the project therefore sought to quantify the impact of ICTs on local livelihoods. 
Secondly, the Oxford Internet Institute, in partnership with the University of Nairobi and 
the National University of Rwanda, is conducting research on the impact of fibre optic 
internet connectivity on value chains in the tea, tourism and ‘information-based services’ 
sectors in Kenya and Rwanda. Author 1 is a sociologist and Africanist by training, and 
this project used more qualitative methods. 50 interviews were conducted with Rwandan 
business managers and policy-makers engaged in the ICT and BPO sectors of the 
Rwandan economy (50 interviews were also conducted in Kenya). This paper draws on 
some of these interviews to provide background to the wider development strategy of the 
GoR.  
Together, the two authors interviewed 27 mobile airtime sellers in three neighbourhoods 
of Rwanda’s capital city, Kigali: Nyabugogo, Nyamirambo and Kiyovu in Kigali Town 
center. These interviews sought to uncover how the expansion of mobile telephony has 
affected the lives and futures of these informal workers. These neighbourhoods were 
chosen due to their different socio-economic conditions. Nyabugogo is a busy taxi and 
bus intersection near the centre of the town. There are also a number of markets in the 
vicinity and therefore a high level of daily traffic. Nyamirambo is a low-income 
residential neighbourhood in the southwest corner of the city. It is the most diverse of all 
Kigali neighbourhoods and houses the majority of the city’s Muslim population. In 
contrast, Kiyovu is the one of the wealthiest areas of Kigali. Stretching from Union Trade 
Center (Rujugiro Building) in the centre of town to Circle Sportif, this area includes high-
end residential properties, President Kagame’s house (Urugwiro village), Kigali Institute 
of Science and Technology (KIST), and the offices of many international businesses and 
NGOs. The area’s informal section has recently been the target of government efforts to 
clear informal slum housing in the capital (Manirakiza, 2012). Together these three areas 
provide an opportunity to better understand the economic and social profiles of airtime 
sellers in different neighbourhoods of Kigali.  
In all three areas, respondents were asked a series of questions, detailing their economic 
and social backgrounds, their personal use of ICTs, their everyday sales activities and 
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their plans for the future.
1
 The interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda out on the 
streets where the sellers worked. The researchers took time to explain the purpose of the 
survey and to ask respondents for informed consent. By and large, individuals were 
happy to take part and most gave half an hour to an hour of their time to answer the 
questions. For all respondents, it was the first time they had been included in an 
economic survey. As always, there are some limitations. The sample size is relatively 
small and restricted to Kigali and unlike Will Rollason’s (2013) long-term ethnographic 
study of motorcycle taxi drivers, our fieldwork involved a one-off survey. There would 
no doubt be differences between urban and rural environments and if we had conducted 
longer term work. Nevertheless, this survey should be received as a first explorative step 
in understanding the human component of the mobile phone infrastructure and the effect 
that this informal employment has had on individual livelihoods. As such, further studies 
are most welcome.  
While informal labour has become a key resource for multinationals seeking to access 
African consumers, it is up to governments like Rwanda’s to ensure that the involvement 
of such companies has lasting and sustainable impacts on the economic and social 
development of the population. Do these workers represent the necessary but disposable 
appendages of ICT growth in Africa? Or will they (and their leaders) find new ways to 
re-insert themselves in future economic configurations?  
Planned Markets 
Rwanda has witnessed a dramatic transformation in its digital infrastructure over the past 
ten years. This change has taken place within the context of what the government of 
Rwanda and its developmental partners have described as stable and continuous GDP 
growth reaching 8.0% in 2012 (World Bank, 2013).
2
 This ‘digital transformation’ is not 
the result of a ‘natural’ diffusion of ICTs, but rather a very purposeful and strategic 
                                                 
1 The survey was modified from a previous survey used by Author 1 for research on 
employment in Khartoum, Sudan. Advice was sought from Keith Hart in order to adapt 
this employment survey for self-employed and entrepreneurial respondents.  
2
 These statistics were produced by the National Statistics Office of Rwanda (NISR), 
quoted by World Bank (2013).  
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attempt on the part of the GoR to re-wire the country to bring about an economic 
transformation (Government of Rwanda, 2012a).  
With its small and predominantly poor population, the country was not initially attractive 
to international companies seeking new markets. To compensate, the GoR, through the 
party-affiliated company, Tri-Star Investment, helped fund the entrance of the South 
African telecommunication company, MTN, into the country (Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi, 2012; Kelsall, 2013). In the words of Tim Kelsall: 
 
Tri-Star contributed to a demonstration effect and learning experience in which one 
of the beneficiaries was an international firm. It thereby ensured not only that 
Rwanda entered the world of mobile telephony earlier than it would otherwise have 
done, but also that the network that was established was at least partly owned by 
domestic capital. (Kelsall, 2013: 129).  
 
This use of government or party funding to attract the participation of ‘private’ 
investment is common across other sectors of the economy and reflects the GoR’s 
particular brand of developmentalism. Booth and Golooba-Muthebi (2012) and Kelsall 
(2013) have argued that the experience of Rwanda is best understood through the concept 
of ‘developmental patrimonialism’, a concept adapted from the work of Mushtaq Khan in 
relation to Asian development (Khan and Sundaram, 2000). Khan claims that given the 
right conditions, rent-seeking or patrimonialism, can promote productive, long-term 
development by ensuring support for economic development from strategic partners in 
the private sector. In addition to the GoR’s stated commitments to macroeconomic 
stability, strong investment in education and infrastructure and the creation of a “business 
friendly environment,” Booth and Golooba-Muthebi have shown how the GoR has 
identified crucial sectors and then allowed ‘party-statals’ to accrue rents and jump-start 
growth in these areas. The case of MTN above, is a case in point. Thus while the GoR 
continually asserts that private enterprise and entrepreneurship are at the heart of the 
country’s growth, government intervention plays a strong role.  
Almost all of the country (99.79%) has now been covered by mobile telephony networks 
with a subscriber base of 5,155,697 as of September 2012 (or 48.1% of the population) 
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(RDB, 2013). By the end of 2016, the Rwanda Development Board projects this number 
to expand to 7,437,196. While MTN still dominates, two other companies, Tigo and 
Airtel have since entered the market. A fourth company and the former parastatal, 
Rwandatel is currently experiencing financial difficulties and its future is uncertain.  
Internet penetration has also expanded from less than 1% in 2000 to 8% in 2012. In order 
to boost internet penetration in all parts of the country, the GoR’s Rwanda Development 
Board (RDB) has laid a national fibre optic backbone and linked up the capital city 
through the Kigali Metropolitan Network. This active development of fibre optic by the 
GoR stands in contrast to internet penetration in Kenya, where the government has taken 
a much less active role and coverage is thus concentrated around the coast and major 
cities. Similarly, when the RDB discovered that there was a shortage of international 
bandwidth and that smaller companies (that were competitors with MTN) could not 
effectively negotiate access to international connectivity, the GoR intervened once more 
to buy bulk capacity from international suppliers at wholesale rates for redistribution 
within the country. It has given responsibility over this internet infrastructure and 
bandwidth supply to Broadband Systems Corporation (BSC), a private company in which 
the GoR is a majority shareholder. These interventions have made it possible for smaller 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to enter the market, particularly in areas with lower 
demand and have slashed wholesale bandwidth costs by 75% (Government of Rwanda, 
2012b). BSC is also establishing data centres and providing cloud services to serve 
national and international clients.  
The GoR was also instrumental in convincing the international payment company Visa to 
choose Rwanda as its African headquarters and research base. While mobile money 
uptake is still low and most poor Rwandans still use low-denomination scratch cards for 
airtime, those in government and the private sector expect a mobile money 
transformation to take place in the coming years. In 2011, Visa launched the Rwanda 
Integrated Payments Processing System, providing a digital infrastructure for electronic 
payments and commerce within the country (Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012). Since then, 
this system has been integrated and harmonized with wider regional payment systems 
like the East African Economic Community’s (EAEC) Common Market Protocol and the 
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Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa’s (COMESA) Regional Payment and 
Settlement System (Mbabazi, 2012; Maiyambere, 2012). These integrations set the stage 
for Rwanda to become a regional trade and financial hub. Indeed, the body charged with 
promoting the cooperation of East African nations in the development of ICT 
infrastructure, the East African Communication Organization (EACO) has its 
headquarters in Kigali.
 
Interestingly, the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA) 
shares a building with EACO, signalling the close alignment of ICT policy with the 
GoR’s ambitions to become a regional economic actor.    
Within the country, Visa has also worked with the Ministry of Finance and the 
Association of Microfinance Institutions of Rwanda (AMIR) to develop a financial 
literacy campaign aimed at small and medium businesses (Nysesigo, 2013). The 
company also plans to launch cashless financial solutions for unbanked customers and to 
work with the GoR to automate and modernize its revenue and tax collection systems. It 
has already launched three e-government services: Online Tax Payment System, the e-
Payment system and the single Electronic Window System (Government of Rwanda, 
2012b). The major telecoms like MTN and Tigo are also developing mobile money 
systems for unbanked customers.  
Companies like MTN are already forecasting the rapid take-up of mobile money among 
their customers, even among the poorest groups. One of MTN’s senior managers 
explained how the company started with scratch cards but has since introduced new 
payment systems as part of its growth strategy: 
Now we have a system here, to do that, buy your airtime… They [the sellers] 
are still in the street but not anymore using scratch cards… It has really made 
some families to grow. And those scratch cards they are making really good 
business and changing the life of people… The same person now we have 
given them the sim card where they can buy electronic stock... So the 
arrangement has changed but to increase the customer experience, we may 
have [to introduce] a safe automated system. And then the customer can use 
mobile money to buy airtime and... doesn’t have to pass through the man on 
the street… because controlling a person on the street and controlling system is 
much more [easy]…because we have the ownership, we know how to control 
it (senior manager, Kigali, 2012). 
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This transition towards a digital payment infrastructure is important for the company 
because it would allow it to sell higher value added services to customers. It would also 
allow the company to have better information about its customers’ spending habits and 
preferences through the proliferation of ‘big data’ (transactional data produced through 
telecommunication use). In the future, when mobile and internet penetration reach 
saturation levels, telecommunication companies based in Africa will need to start pushing 
higher value services in order to continue to grow. They may also begin to sell data about 
their customers to other companies. Given the GoR’s vocal support of ‘ICT 
entrepreneurship’ among the youth, the spread of mobile money is highly strategic for 
software developers and start-ups seeking to monetize their applications. 
Lastly, such developments are useful for African governments for security, surveillance 
and taxation purposes. Zambia, Kenya and Lagos city have already automated some of 
their taxation operations and have markedly increased their revenues (Blair, 2009; 
Alemika et al. 2011; TCS, 2013). In the summer of 2013, the Kenya Revenue Authority 
(KRA) announced that it would become mandatory for all medium and large taxpayers to 
file and pay taxes electronically (Mutai, 2013). KRA is also using the 
telecommunications network to identify non-compliant Small and Medium Enterprises 
for tax purposes. If other governments wish to automate and digitally process taxes, then 
mobile money penetration needs to increase.  
This deeper penetration of mobile phone and data services among the population is also 
likely to increase the security and surveillance capacities of states as big data is 
increasingly being used by African governments for counter-terrorism and police work. 
In line with EAC integration, Rwanda made it mandatory for all mobile phone 
subscribers to register their sim cards in 2013 (Daily Monitor, 2013) and the GoR is 
currently developing a motorcycle database in collaboration with Tigo in order to 
improve security and road safety (Rollason, 2013). In Kenya, the telecommunications 
giant, Safaricom has recently won a contract to increase the intelligence and security 
capacities of the state in order to deal with Al-Shabab terrorism (David, 2014; Standard, 
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2014). As the GoR faces similar threats from remnants of génocidaires, it is likely that 
similar arrangements are being negotiated between government agencies and 
telecommunications companies in Rwanda as well.  
At all points, the GoR has intervened in the roll-out of all three infrastructures (mobile 
telephony, internet and mobile money) because it views ICTs are a strategic component 
of their development vision. This vision is outlined in the national development plan, 
Vision 2020, which seeks to build a knowledge-based economy and to transform Rwanda 
into a middle-income country by 2020 (Government of Rwanda, 2000; Government of 
Rwanda, 2012b). Current government strategy for promoting ICT development focuses 
on two key objectives.  
Firstly, it seeks to attract international companies like Visa, Google and SAP to set up 
regional headquarters in the country and help upgrade the country’s infrastructure. 
Similarly, it seeks to provide a bridge for West African companies like Ghana’s Ecobank 
to penetrate East Africa. To do this, the GoR has attempted to provide a legible and 
predictable framework for international actors to enter the country.
 
In 2000, it established 
the Rwanda Investment Promotion Agency in order to bring more foreign direct 
investment into the country. This agency has since created a one-stop centre for new 
business registration. In 2001, the GoR established the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory 
Authority (RURA) and the Rwandan Information Technology Authority (RITA)
3
 to 
regulate and promote ICT-based economic growth in the country. In the same year, it 
introduced a Zero-Tolerance for Corruption Policy (Porter et al., 2013). More broadly, 
the GoR has worked to strengthen security and improve the visual appearance of the 
country, through a heavy police presence, new paved roads, street lighting and signs, the 
outlawing of plastic bags and the prohibition of any unlicensed commercial activities on 
open streets. Due to these policies, the country has achieved high rankings in 
international matrices like the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business, Transparency 
International’s Corruption Index and the ITU’s ICT Development Index. The effect of the 
visual transformation is also clear when one speaks to foreign businesspeople.  
                                                 
3
 RITA has since been subsumed into the ICT department of the RDB. 
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Secondly, the GoR hopes to support young Rwandan ICT entrepreneurs. Shortly after 
taking power, the GoR established Kigali Institute of Technology in an effort to boost its 
number of advanced technology students. It also sends Rwandan students abroad for 
training in IT and engineering. In 2010, Rwanda was reported to send an average of 300 
IT and engineering students to India per year (Onyango-Obbo, 2010). Similarly, it has 
wooed the American university, Carnegie Mellon to open a graduate degree program for 
East Africa in Kigali. In its first year in 2012, the program offered 40 places to Masters 
students from across the region. By 2016, it hopes to increase this number to 150. Outside 
of academia, the GoR has also helped finance an innovation and incubation hub, k-Lab, 
to support innovation and entrepreneurship among Kigali’s tech savvy youth.4 At the 
primary and secondary level, it has worked with the American program, One Laptop Per 
Child (OLPC) to deliver laptops to Rwandan school children. It has already donated 
100,000 computers and hopes to deliver another 500,000 over the next 5 years (OLPC, 
2013).  
Through the dual approach of attracting international business and promoting local skills, 
the GoR hopes that the ICT sector will help create employment and entrepreneurship 
opportunities for its population. Vision 2020 sets the target of 1.4 million non-agricultural 
jobs by 2020 and the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) 
sets the target of creating 1,000,000 non-agricultural jobs by 2012 and 2,500,000 by 2020 
(Government of Rwanda, 2007a). Telecommunications have certainly contributed to job 
creation. Tim Kelsall writes: 
 
Today, the MTN operation is invariably one of the top two taxpayers in Rwanda. It 
employs 690 people directly, only two of whom are expatriates. Indirect 
employment, including dealerships and security guards, is estimated at over five 
thousand. (Kelsall, 2013: 165).  
 
                                                 
4
 K-Lab, Carnegie Mellon and BSC are all currently in the same building, the Telecom 
House, along with many small and medium ICT businesses. In 2014, the RDB hopes to 
start construction on a technopole city to expand Carnegie Mellon and provide space for 
international and national tech and BPO companies. 
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With Tigo and Airtel now in the country, these opportunities have grown further. 
Employment within these multinationals exposes Rwandan workers to international 
systems and technologies and allows them to forge relationships and to acquire trainings 
in other countries. Among the young entrepreneurs interviewed in the Oxford study, a 
significant number had worked in a large telecom before striking out on their own.  
The GoR hopes the country will benefit from arrangements with multinational companies 
through knowledge transfer and revenue-sharing. It has also worked directly with such 
companies to roll out e-government and other digital systems within its own borders. 
While officials emphasize that providing better and more efficient public services is the 
main motivation driving e-government programs, the GoR also sees them as a strategic 
way of making the country an attractive testing ground for international companies 
wanting to develop and pilot solutions for the rest of Africa and the developing world. 
The GoR hopes that when the time comes to take these innovations into neighbouring 
countries, Rwandan workers and consultants will be well positioned. Of course, these 
formal opportunities are restricted to those employed under formal contracts and certainly 
do not extend to those selling credit on the street.  
While the GoR supports the development of ICT entrepreneurship and regularly 
encourages Rwandan youth to engage, it places emphasis on youth at the top socio-
economic scale and on professional jobs. This is a problem because the GoR is behind its 
schedule for creating non-agricultural jobs. In 2007, for example, the GoR revealed that it 
was projected to create less than half the for 2010 (Government of Rwanda, 2007a). 
Similarly in its 2010 Special Economic Zone Policy document, high unemployment was 
identified as one of the major economic constraints facing government plans. The report 
writes: 
There is a shortage of non rural/agriculture formal employment opportunities in 
Rwanda. There are only 7,263 formal SMEs constituting offering full-time jobs to 
1.4% of the working population. Growing unemployment, especially amongst 
Rwanda‘s rapidly growing youth population, will reduce the impact of growth on 
poverty (Government of Rwanda, 2010: 8). 
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There is therefore an urgent need to understand job creation for ordinary Rwandans who 
do not come from privileged socio-economic backgrounds. How can professional jobs 
and business opportunities at the top of the ICT value chain also create jobs for those 
beneath?  
While Booth and Golooba-Mutebi’s ‘developmental patrimonial’ framework has proved 
useful in understanding the institutional capacities and motivation of the state to mobilize 
the country towards economic transformation, it does not tell us very much about how 
this model trickles down to ordinary Rwandans and it does not capture the interplay 
between large scale investment (multinational or domestic) and local informal systems on 
the ground. The next section therefore looks at economic and social position of airtime 
sellers to better understand how informal workers may have benefitted from economic 
upgrading.  
Ask Not What Your Company Can Do For You  
On a given afternoon in Kigali, Rwanda, one can find hundreds of mobile airtime sellers 
on the corners of the major streets. Hawking their MTN, Tigo and Airtel scratch cards 
and wearing colourful plastic waistcoats of yellow, blue and red, these predominantly 
young, male and low educated sellers represent the human vessels through which 
multinational companies travel into the phones and pockets of African consumers.  
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Figure 1: Photographs of Kigali airtime sellers, taken by Author 2. 
 
The term Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) has been popularized by authors such as C.K. 
Prahalad (2005), Stuart Hart and Ted London (2005) to refer to the economic 
opportunities and markets of poor consumers in the developing world. In the business 
school literature, BOP tends to be associated with pro-poor development, social 
enterprise and poverty alleviation. BOP initiatives are often presented as a kind of ‘win-
win’ for business and poor people, with the claims that they firstly, provide affordable 
consumer goods to the poor and second, that they usually involve poor people within 
their distribution networks. However other authors such as Catherine Dolan (2012), Julia 
Elyachar (2012) and Kate Meagher (2013) have been more critical of these 
developments.  
 
Julia Elyachar has adapted Simone’s (2004) concept of ‘people as infrastructure’ to argue 
that multinationals seeking new markets have come to see the social networks of the poor 
as potential distribution systems for their products and services, thereby commodifying 
the ‘social capital’ of poor people into multinational chains of accumulation (Elyachar 
2005). In relation to BOP in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kate Roll and Catherine Dolan have 
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likewise argued that BOP ‘repurposes’ informality (that is, unregulated and unprotected 
labour of the poor) transforming it from something that was once seen as “drag on 
growth,” into something ‘developmental’ and ‘useful’ for transnational capital.  They 
write, BOP initiatives:  
 
create and stabilize a framing of poverty as a product of market failure and its 
solution as the advancing of enterprise and market integration—a framing that 
facilitates the organization of informal economies as the objective of corporate 
governance and positions market engagement as commensurate with development 
imperatives (Dolan and Roll, 2013: 129). 
 
Airtime sellers fit within this theoretical framework well. Multinational 
telecommunication companies use informal labour to market and distribute airtime and 
thus avoid expending time and money researching the challenging environment of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s consumer markets. While these companies have been able to frame this 
use of informal labour as a kind of pro-poor social enterprise, it is important to see how 
they have also depended on these sellers to penetrate ‘illegible’ markets. We therefore 
need to understand the balance of benefits between informal workers and these 
companies to determine if such an arrangement should be construed as ‘social enterprise’ 
or ‘pro-poor’. While the telecommunication companies are building long-term, highly 
profitable infrastructures for both delivering content and services and accessing 
potentially valuable data about Rwanda’s population and economy, the credit-sellers are 
primarily gaining short-term financial benefits and some long term skills and expertise. 
This section outlines those benefits in closer detail.   
  
MTN, Tigo and Airtel all use similar practices to manage their airtime voucher sellers. 
There are no formal entry requirements or recruitment procedures. Sellers merely need to 
approach one of the main offices of the companies to buy discounted airtime vouchers. 
There, they are given some basic marketing paraphernalia in the form of waistcoats, 
street booths and sun umbrellas. Beyond the provision of visible marketing materials, the 
telecommunication companies do not regulate the activities of sellers. They work on 
commission, receiving no training or support from suppliers. When a seller reaches a 
certain level of sales, they are able to save up and purchase a moto and thereby become ‘a 
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distributor’ (provided that his/her chosen area does not already have a distributor).  
For many, selling airtime is the closest they have come to formal employment. Amongst 
the sample surveyed, the majority had been employed in construction, informal trading or 
unskilled farm labour before selling airtime. For example, the oldest respondent (aged 41) 
had lost his job in construction and had decided to start selling airtime when he found that 
construction jobs had become too rare. Others had never had a steady job. 33.33% of 
respondents had come to airtime selling on their own initiative while 40.74% were helped 
by friends who had given them advice and instruction to start. Most were born in rural 
areas and had come to Kigali to find better work opportunities. Only five were born in 
Kigali with a large proportion (11/27) coming from the Southern province. The majority 
lived in the poorer neighbourhoods of Kigali, often traveling substantial distances to sell 
vouchers in the central areas of the city.  
One advantage for companies using informal networks for distribution is that they do not 
need to carry out market research. They merely let the sellers use their own ‘market 
intelligence’ to determine where business is most profitable. Use of informal networks 
shifts the risks onto those at the bottom of the pyramid.  
The sellers are overwhelming young people. Their age ranges between 17 and 41, but 
89%(24) of them are between 19 and 30. 
Age category Frequency 
Less than 18 4 % 
Between 19 and 30 89% 
Above 30 7% 
 
The majority of sellers are male, with only 30% (8) female present in the sample. They 
come from a relatively low educated demographic. All had attended some level of 
primary school with four leaving before finishing, 18.5 % (8) more leaving after they had 
completed primary school. 67% (18) had attended some level of secondary school but 
 
 
 18 
only 37% (10) had finished. None had attended university. When asked why they had 
dropped out of school, the overwhelming response was because of poverty and lack of 
finance. While primary education has been officially free since 2003 (and secondary 
education free since 2006),
 5
 voluntary contributions, school supplies and the costs 
associated with forsaken wages all make education prohibitively expensive for many 
young people. And as the paper discusses below, the financial returns of formal education 
for young people operating in the informal sector are currently limited.  
All surveyed respondents owned personal mobile phones. 52 %( 14) used two SIM-cards 
so that they could sell both MTN and Tigo vouchers. 63 % (17) could access the internet 
over their phones. When probed deeper, 41% (11) used internet on a regular basis. 55 % 
(15) used both mobile phones and cybercafés in order to access internet. 18.5 % (5) used 
their mobile phones only and 26% (7) used cybercafés only.
6
  The biggest barriers to 
internet use were a lack of access to computers and laptops (63%), insufficient English 
(52%) and insufficient spare time (29%). The figures on language and spare time are 
particularly interesting because the GoR’s current focus on extending internet access 
through network coverage and digital buses.
7
 As the GoR moves towards ‘e-
government,’ it will have to address these other barriers as well. Providing physical 
infrastructure is no silver bullet without wider socio-economic change.  
All but one of our respondents was able to send and receive money over the mobile 
phone. This number is significantly high, given the limited use of mobile money in the 
general population. At the end of 2012, only 20% of the MTN’s mobile subscriber base 
used mobile money (Butera, 2012). As mobile phone use was at 46% among the general 
population at the end of 2012, mobile money was clearly still quite rare at the time of the 
                                                 
5
 It must be noted that while education is officially free, students still face a number of 
financial barriers. For example, there are disparities between official law and lower levels 
of policy. In addition, in many schools, students are expected to pay Parent Teacher 
Association (PTA) fees. If they are unable to contribute PTA fees, students are often 
excluded. For more information, please see: Williams, 2013.    
6
 Although there are no reliable statistics on frequency of internet use by users, all 
indicators suggest that these figures are very high relative to the rest of the population. 
7
 Digital buses are internet enabled buses that travel to rural areas and provide access to 
remote communities. 
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interviews and is still at a low rate. Airtime sellers are therefore well ahead of the 
adoption curve. In addition to sending and receiving money, a high number of 
respondents (70.34%) were also using official saving schemes either through banks, 
MTN mobile money or Tigo cash.
8
 As telecommunication companies begin to team up 
with banks, micro-finance and saving and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) to deliver 
micro-credit, those using mobile money will become more ‘visible’ and ‘predictable,’ 
and therefore more likely to be eligible for credit and financial inclusion. In Kenya, 
Safaricom has already started modelling the behaviour of its mobile phone users to 
uncover credit worthiness and offer insurance and loan services. Airtime sellers are 
therefore well positioned to benefit from these kinds of programs and may well find ways 
to integrate themselves, either formally or informally, into future credit and insurance 
value chains. 
On average, airtime sellers in Kigali city earn 3984 Rwandan francs (Rwf) or 6 dollars 
per day (although this figure varies considerably depending on the area and seller’s initial 
investment).
9
 When compared to the average wage of Rwandans of a similar education 
profile, this figure is very high. For example, rural Rwandans of a similar educational 
background reportedly earn as little as 200-300 Rwf a day working as ‘diggers’ or ‘farm 
labourers’ (Sommers, 2012). 10 Prostitutes reportedly earn 100-500 Rwf per client 
(Sommers, 2012). Higher up in the education scale, Rwandan schoolteachers can expect 
to earn 44,000 per year (until recently, 25,000 a year), or 121 Rwf per day.
11
 Only Kigali 
motorcycle drivers earn similar amounts, ranging from between 1,000 and 5,000 Rwf per 
                                                 
8
 For an analysis of saving within the Rwandan population as a whole, please see NISR, 
2012. 
9
 As Will Rollason has indicated in his study of motorcycle drivers, Rwandan 
respondents from low socio-economic backgrounds have been found to under-report or 
exaggerate their earnings (2013). He found that responses to questions about earnings 
declined as respondents gained trust in the research team.  
10
 Mark Sommers conducted his fieldwork in 2006. Some researchers now estimate that 
diggers earn 500-800 Rwf per day. This number was provided Marie Berry, a Sociology 
PhD student from UCLA who has conducted more recent fieldwork in Rwanda. Please 
see Berry, forthcoming.  
11
 To calculate earnings per day, the annual salary was divided by 365. However, 
Rwandan schools currently have 32 weeks of term and another 13 days of exams. It is 
probable that teachers supplement this income during holidays through secondary 
employment. (In2EastAfrica, 2012). 
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day (Rollason, 2013: 16). Selling vouchers on the street therefore represents a relatively 
affluent job for low-income Rwandans (although rent and food is likely to be more 
expensive in Kigali). It also exposes them to sales and customer service experiences and 
opportunities to network with local businesspeople.  
The tables below show earnings in different areas of the city.   
NYABUGOGO GRAPH OF PROFIT 
 
The average money Nyabugogo sellers can get per day is 2126 Rwf, the highest is 3400 
Rwf and the lowest is 1400 Rwf.  
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The average money Nyamirambo sellers earn per day is 3334 Rwf, the highest is 9012 
Rwf and the lowest is 1590 Rwf.  The highest earner, who pushes up the average, comes 
from a particular background: he had formerly lived abroad in Uganda and had started 
selling vouchers after an accident caused him to stop working as a moto driver. He 
worked in Biryogo, a crowded and busy part of Nyamirambo and he invested a lot of 
money into buying scratch cards at the start of every day.  
TOWN CENTER (KIYOVU) GRAPH OF PROFIT  
 
 
On average, sellers in Kiyyovu earn 5917 Rwf per day. Here, the highest is 15900 Rwf 
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and the lowest is 1588 Rwf. These figures are higher due the concentration of people in 
the centre of town during the day. The highest earner who takes home 15900 Rwf per day 
had already been promoted to MTN distributor. 
We tested whether gender or education had any effect on profit and found that within the 
sample there was no statistical relationship between gender or education and earnings.
12
 
According to these results, sellers do not appear to increase their profits based on 
obtaining formal education. Other factors such as the area of operation and the amount of 
personal investment in vouchers were more important. This finding is in keeping with 
other studies of economic opportunity and educational attainment in Rwanda. For 
example, a USAID project found that “graduates of secondary school or technical school 
are often just as likely to be unemployed as those with fewer years of schooling” (EDC, 
2009). In Will Rollason’s study of motorcycle taxi drivers, he similarly found that there 
was “[n]o evidence… that a rider’s level of education had any effect on income” 
(Rollason, 2013: 20). For many of Rwanda’s citizens, it would appear that education has 
not yet improved their economic prospects.  
However, it is clear that the mobile phone boom in Rwanda has indeed provided 
opportunities to low-income, low educated Rwandan youths to earn a relatively decent 
wage. When compared to many of the sectors where multinational companies are active 
in Africa, the telecommunication sector does seem to ‘trickle down’ to lower socio-
economic groups. Importantly, these airtime sellers have been able to save money, partly 
as a result of their integration and familiarity with mobile money infrastructures. 
However, as indicated above, this period of opportunity is temporary. As internet access 
and mobile money expand, the opportunities for street sellers will diminish. It is 
important to ask what else these young men and women can do to retain their (modestly 
improving) socio-economic statuses. Their relatively high savings rate and higher 
familiarity with ICTs and internet use indicate that they have acquired some soft skills 
                                                 
12
 For gender, the probability value is 0.191>5%. So at 5% of level of significance, it can 
be surmised that the gender does not influence the income earned. For primary and 
secondary education, the p-value is 0.319>5%. At 5% level of significance, it can be 
surmised that primary or secondary school does not affect how much profit phone credit 
sellers earn. 
 
 
 23 
through their participation in selling airtime.  
Self-reliance and control 
When conducting research in Rwanda, one is often struck by the determination and 
strong belief of ordinary Rwandans in the government’s Vision 2020 program. In 
interviews with managers and entrepreneurs, it is striking how many align their own 
business plans with that of Vision 2020, often speaking unsolicited about the president, 
Paul Kagame as a source of personal inspiration. Among Rwandan businesspeople, there 
is clearly a sense of pride in what has already been accomplished and a strong sense of 
hope for the future. Obviously these groups have benefited most from Rwanda’s 
development since 1994. One might expect that it would be more difficult to get the same 
perspective from less affluent Rwandans. Nevertheless, the hopeful discourse of the GoR 
does appear to have influenced our sample of sellers.  
In interviews, respondents were asked to reflect on a number of statements designed to 
solicit their sense of hopefulness and their expectations about future economic security. 
All respondents agreed with the statement ‘I am hopeful about the future’ with all the 
respondents in two areas ‘strongly agreeing’ with this statement. While it was 
acknowledged that permanent work opportunities are few and far between, respondents 
also expressed the belief that ‘anyone can get a job if he tries hard enough’. Respondents 
more strongly identified with the belief that “If I want to be successful in the future, I 
need to start my own business” than with the statement: “If I want to be successful in the 
future, I need to find a permanent job”. The following tables show responses from the 
three areas: 
NYABUGOGO sellers 
How much do you agree with the following statements? 
“Work is so rare that people do not 
share information widely” 
11% strongly agree, 43% somewhat agree, 46% strongly 
disagree 
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“Anyone can get a permanent job if 
he tries hard enough” 
89% strongly agree, 11% somewhat agree. 
“I am hopeful about the future” 11% strongly agree, 89% somewhat agree  
“If I want to be successful in the 
future, I need to start my own 
business” 
67% strongly agree, 10% somewhat agree. 11% neutral, 11% 
somewhat disagree and 11% strongly disagree. 
“If I want to be successful in the 
future, I need to find a permanent 
job” 
11% strongly agree, 78% somewhat agree, and 11% neutral 
NYAMIRAMBO sellers 
How much do you agree with the following statements?  
“Work is so rare that people do 
not share information widely” 
71% somewhat agree, 14% somewhat disagree and 15% 
strongly disagree. 
“Anyone can get a permanent job 
if he tries hard enough” 
100% strongly agree. 
“I am hopeful about the future” 43% strongly agree and 57% somewhat agree. 
“If I want to be successful in the 
future, I need to start my own 
business” 
86% strongly agree, 14% somewhat agree 
“If I want to be successful in the 
future, I need to find a permanent 
job” 
43% strongly agree, 57% somewhat agree. 
 
TOWN CENTER (Kiyovu Zone) sellers 
How much do you agree with the following statements? 
“Work is so rare that people do 
not share information widely” 
55% strongly agree, 45% somewhat agree. 
“Anyone can get a permanent job 
if he tries hard enough” 
91% strongly agree, 9% somewhat agree. 
“I am hopeful about the future” 55% strongly agree, 45% somewhat agree. 
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“If I want to be successful in the 
future, I need to start my own 
business” 
82% strongly agree, 18% somewhat agree. 
“If I want to be successful in the 
future, I need to find a permanent 
job” 
45% strongly agree, 55% somewhat agree. 
 
Thus, in contrast to the respondents surveyed in Mark Sommer’s book, Stuck (2012) 
respondents were largely positive about their futures. Mark Sommer’s work concentrated 
on young people in rural Rwanda and Burundi. He found that the Rwandan youths in his 
sample faced bleak work prospects (partly as a result of the banning of many informal 
livelihoods) and limited capacities to save and start families. Surprisingly, their prospects 
compared unfavourably with those in Burundi, a country considered less economically 
successful. While the mobile phone credit sellers have little job security, they are doing 
better than many other Rwandans and are fairly positive about their futures. Whether this 
is due to their residence in urban areas or whether it is due to the particular activity of 
selling airtime, one cannot ascertain with certainty. However, it is clear that working as 
airtime sellers has given them a sustained source of income and a source of self-
motivation.  
52% of the sample was self-sufficient and self-contained (they do not receive financial 
assistance from others nor do they support others) with a further 33% offering support to 
other people. Despite being relatively self-sufficient, most lived with other young people 
in order to save money on rent. The majority used earnings to cover rent and food 
expenses, with many stating that it was hard for them to save given the high cost of living 
in Kigali. One respondent also used a large proportion of his income to pay for school 
fees (he was the only respondent still at school). The others did not feel that education 
offered a good investment.  
70.34% had ambitions to move up to the role of supervisor or distributor once they had 
earned enough money. Only 11.11% didn’t want to move up in the system. These 
answers suggest that sellers are not aware that infrastructures are likely to change in 
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future. When pressed for alternatives, many expressed the desire to continue to be sellers 
of other products in the future, explaining that they had acquired sales experience and had 
accumulated savings. Of these, men aspired to become drivers of motos and taxis and 
used their earnings to pay for driving school fees. Women respondents aspired to become 
sellers of clothes and fruit, and used their earnings to save for investments.  
It is clear, both from their responses about the future and from their stated future plans 
that our respondents view self-employment as a more realistic prospect than finding 
permanent employment. These sentiments reflect the GoR’s promotion of 
entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency. In 19999, the GoR launched and has since heavily 
financed a Private Sector Federation to help coordinate private enterprises. It has also 
worked with many international organizations like Educat, Bridge2Rwanda, Isoko 
Foundation, Global Relief and Development Partners, Karisimbi Partners, and Digital 
Opportunity Trust to promote a pro-entrepreneurial mind-set within the population. This 
ideological project is important to the government as it fears ideologies of political 
tribalism. It is for these various reasons, that Rwanda has been called a model of ‘market-
led development’ by business school scholars, despite the strong intervention of the 
government in infrastructure and party-statals (Fox, 2013). 
However, the GoR has diverged from other African governments in terms of how that 
discourse has been translated into policies affecting poor people. While many other 
African governments have permitted and even encouraged street vendors and other self-
employed informal workers (Hope, 2012; 85), the GoR has taken a much firmer view of 
informal commercial activity. It has focused on the formalization of informal systems of 
economic governance, seeing formality as the basis for scaling up the economy and 
providing security.   
The chief way the GoR hopes to engage low-level commercial activities is through the 
cooperative model. Cooperatives are intended to further the economic development of 
Rwandan producers by integrating individual producers into formal systems of regulation 
and connecting them with opportunities within larger value chains (Government of 
Rwanda, 2007b). However, Rollason’s research on the motorcycle cooperatives (2013) 
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has shown that cooperatives have not contributed significantly to poverty reduction but 
have improved security and control within the sector. In contrast, motorcycle drivers saw 
the informal ‘boss’ system as a way to significantly improve their living standards. This 
system allowed drivers to rent or lease-hire for purchase motorcycles on terms that are 
affordable to them. Similar formalised schemes organized by cooperatives were deemed 
to require unaffordable down-payments and restrictions requiring riders to apply for loans 
as larger groups (23).  
In many cases, economic activities that take place outside of cooperatives are forbidden 
and police will fine, imprison or impound the equipment of those who transgress 
(Rollason, 2013; Berry, forthcoming). For example, Marie Berry has shown that female 
dominated activities such as fruit selling and domestic labour are heavily policed, as such 
activities are seen to undermine the broader (visual) economic transformation of the 
country (Berry, forthcoming). The position of informal airtime sellers is therefore unique 
and reflects their pivotal role in the penetration of the mobile infrastructure into local 
communities and social networks. Selling airtime on an informal basis on a street corner 
on behalf of a large multinational company is permissible, but selling other goods 
informally on the street independently of large companies is not permitted. In one case, 
individuals have taken the initiative as ‘entrepreneurs’ in their own right- whereas in the 
other case, they are part of the distribution strategy of a large multinational company. 
One might ask which activity is closer to the entrepreneurial discourse of the GoR.  
The government needs reliable internet connectivity and a higher uptake of ICTs and 
mobile money among those at the bottom of the pyramid if Rwanda is to become an ICT 
hub. For this reason, it has been convenient to allow telecommunication companies to 
deploy informal labour arrangements and the GoR has therefore made it possible. 
However, while telecommunication companies are benefitting from the long-term 
development of a service distribution and data accumulation system, the street sellers are 
only temporary beneficiaries of the scheme. We might ask what kinds of economic plans 
can be developed to incorporate these kinds of people into the ‘knowledge-based 
economy’ in the long term. What kinds of financial support systems, training and social 
networks can be provided to make their visions of the future also possible? Most 
 
 
 28 
importantly, any strategies should allow them to leave behind the day-to-day bustle of 
street survival for long-term productivity and security. It is these kinds of debates that 
this paper hopes to incite within the country.   
Conclusion: A Developmental Patrimonialism for Whom? 
The use of informal labour within formal multinational corporations is becoming more 
and more common across Africa. For example, in a 2005 study of informal and formal 
contracts in Nairobi, Kenya, Philippe Bocquier found that “most of the employees of the 
so-called informal sector [were] actually informally contracted by large, medium or 
small-scale enterprises” (Bocquier, 2005: 17). In fact, he found that seven out of eight 
workers were employed by formal companies on informal contracts. This state of affairs 
is becoming so inconspicuous that the ILO has re-classified the ‘informal sector’ as the 
‘informal economy’ to account for informally contracted workers operating in the formal 
economy (ILO, 2009).  
Once a nuisance for economic planners, informal economies are now viewed as a source 
of flexibility and as a means of making the illegible and risky ‘black spots’ of Africa 
accessible to foreign direct investment and government interventions (Elyachar, 2005, 
2012; Meagher, 2013; Dolan, 2013; Mann, 2013). The blurring of formal and informal 
economies of course has a longer historical precedent, with the use of informal, 
temporary and often exploited labourers on colonial schemes (Wolpe, 1972; Shenton and 
Freud, 1978; Bernal, 1991; El-Battahani, 2009). What is new, however, is the celebration 
of these practices as ‘ethical’ and ‘socially responsible’ and as a means of achieving 
inclusive economic development at ‘the bottom of the pyramid’. 
The pressing question is not whether ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ has created jobs and 
opportunities, but what kinds of opportunities. The sellers discussed in this article earn 
relatively high wages, as compared to workers in other parts of the economy. They have 
also been able to acquire some limited soft skills: familiarity with ICTs, general sales 
experience and expertise using mobile money systems and savings schemes. Some of 
them have managed to save small amounts to invest in future activities. As mentioned 
above, it is also likely that these groups will find informal or formal ways of inserting 
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themselves into banking, saving and insurance programs in future. However, when it 
comes to the economic plans currently being envisioned and implemented by the GoR, 
there is limited scope for them to be included in higher value activities or to find 
employment in more formally contracted careers. Their employment has not exposed 
them to the kinds of skills and training that would allow them to take advantage of the 
higher-end possibilities currently being built behind the scenes, nor has their formal 
education been advantageous to them as informal street sellers. Attempts to police 
‘informal’ entrepreneurship further diminish the likelihood of sustainable livelihoods. 
While Booth and Golooba-Muthebi focus on the developmental state from the 
perspective of elite coalitions, one might push them to consider the long-term 
sustainability of the model. The collaboration of the GoR with multinational companies 
allows it to develop the physical infrastructure of the economy and to create export 
earnings, but this is a very top-down style of growth. In spite of the discourse 
surrounding SME development and youth entrepreneurship, Gathani and Stoelinga have 
shown that 80% of the output from Rwanda’s 47 manufacturing and agribusiness firms 
comes from large groups (that is companies that have business interests in more than 3 
companies) (Gathani and Stoelinga, 2013). As Gathani and Stoelinga write,  
in the current business environment of Rwanda’s manufacturing and agribusiness sectors, 
smaller firms owned by individual investors find it difficult to compete. As long as long-
term finance, skills, sourcing and transportation constraints remain binding, smaller firms 
in the manufacturing sector are likely to be outperformed by firms owned by larger 
groups” (Gathani and Stoelinga, 2013: 51).  
The legitimacy of the current developmental model rests on its developmental outcomes, 
the extent to which ordinary people benefit from the GoR’s plans. Following calls by 
Elyachar (2012), Dolan (2012) and Meagher (2013), this article therefore stresses that 
planners and researchers need to think more critically about value chains at the bottom of 
the pyramid, not just in terms of how informal networks can be used as temporary 
appendages to further the reach of formal corporations (Prahalad; 2005; Hart and 
London; 2005), but how these new kinds of chains and networks can be re-engineered to 
provide permanent and sustainable livelihoods to workers and business owners at the 
bottom of the pyramid.  
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As the Rwandan government has shown time and time again, markets do not form 
naturally or automatically; they are built and shaped through linked interactions between 
foreign investors, local private companies and public bodies. When we acknowledge that 
markets are created, we can begin to create more stable and inclusive markets. As Will 
Rollason (2013) has suggested, informal economic arrangements such as the ‘boss 
system’ have provided real poverty reduction and social mobility for poor Rwandans by 
facilitating the transfer of wealth from the relatively well-off to the poor in processes that 
fit with the local socio-economic needs of the population. While the GoR has hereto 
committed itself to the formalization of informal economic systems and has taken steps to 
stamp down on unlicensed commercial activity, it might be wiser to look more closely at 
these existing arrangements and recognize their contribution to growth and poverty 
reduction.  
The telecommunication sector and other ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ opportunities have 
proved a great boon for African economies, but it is important to ask what kinds of social 
and institutional changes is emerging from this boom (Jerven, 2010). Changing digital 
infrastructures are currently re-wiring the economies of Africa, allowing companies to 
outsource internal functions to domestic and international partners (Mann and Graham, 
2013) and allowing governments to better centralize rent management and to potentially 
control low-level corruption (Blair, 2009; Alemika et al. 2011; Mutai, 2013; TCS, 2013). 
They are allowing international companies to insert themselves into modernization 
projects, automate old companies, re-engineer out-of-date government institutions, 
improve efficiency and create high-end, high-value jobs for some. These systems may 
also allow highly educated African software developers to build new applications and 
products for the mass market. Occasionally the expansion of such infrastructure may 
require a flexible and unskilled labour force on hand to reach into new markets and 
distribute goods to ‘black spots,’ but these opportunities must be seen for what they are: 
moments of capitalism that are likely to shift as companies change their needs and 
strategies. If e-government and payment systems are successfully pioneered, there will be 
limited scope for the kinds of informal value addition that drove the initial expansion of 
the mobile telephony network. While these solutions may allow governments to reduce 
low-levels of corruption and to centralise rents at the top, informal (and sometimes 
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illegal) arrangements also provide opportunities for poorer groups. 
Discourses surrounding contemporary forms of globalization and modernization tend to 
phrase such change as progressive and irreversible, as forces that always move forward, 
expanding opportunities as diffusion spreads and integration occurs (Ohmae, 1995; 
Krugman, 1996). Similarly, proponents of BOP development suggest that inequality and 
poverty only occur when there are market distortions, but this approach fails to account 
for instances where markets are working well but work opportunities dry out. This paper 
has shown that inclusion and development come in fits and spurts, booms and busts, as 
production and distribution systems unfold across a bumpy landscape and as people on 
the ground find ways to insert themselves, formally and informally, into official plans. 
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